The Market for Television Ad Time: Model and Evidence*

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Abstract

We present a model of a market for television ad time based on an explicit characterization of an advertisement’s contribution to an advertiser’s profits and the recognition that consumers’ media choices segment consumers. Contrary to Fournier and Martin’s (1983) “law of one price,” our model implies that each program faces a downward sloping demand curve in selling access to its audience. We study these contrasting arguments about television advertising by examining the pricing of broadcast network advertising. We conclude that the evidence is consistent with the segmentation of the national television advertising market and thereby with the model of a market for ad time presented herein.

Key Words: Advertising, Competition, Segmentation
1. **Introduction**

   Advertising plays a critical role in funding various media, including Internet, in the United States. Despite this role, researchers have devoted relatively little attention to the way media firms price access to their audiences. Rather, more attention has been given to the relationship between advertising and firm sales, and thereby on a firm’s demand for ad space or time in aggregate (e.g., Grossman and Shapiro (1984)).

   Typically, economic models of competition among media outlets for advertisers have either explicitly or implicitly presumed a competitive market model with fairly simple characterizations of advertisers’ demand for advertising time. Thus it is conjectured that suppliers of advertising confront an infinitely elastic demand curve, or that there is a “law of one price” in advertising markets. While the primary empirical evidence for this “law of one price” is found in Fournier and Martin (1983), who studied television advertising, this characterization is applied to other media markets as evidenced by Federal Communication Commission (FCC) media merger analyses and Berry and Waldfogel (1999).

   Occasionally, a downward sloping inverse demand function in the amount of ad time (or space for print media) may be postulated. However, such a characterization is used for models of media monopolists (see, e.g., Blair and Romano, 1993) and empirical studies of newspaper markets with geographically separated firms (Rosse and Dertouzos, 1979; Dertouzos and Trautman, 1990).

   We present a different way of thinking about the pricing of advertising. Consistent with the reasoning in Grossman and Shapiro (1984), we model the demand for ad time on television programs as a function of a TV commercial’s contribution to advertiser profits. We then recognize that consumers’ media choices induce a segmentation of these markets.¹ We show that, for a model of competition in the sale of TV ad time based on these foundations, there is no single market-determined price for ad time that applies to all sellers. Rather, each program sees the demand for its commercial time as downward sloping, regardless of its competitive circumstances. So the “law of one price” does not hold in this market. Consistent with these arguments we provide
2. The model

2.1 The basic model

We consider two types of programs: programs distributed by over-the-air or broadcast services and programs that are distributed on a subscription basis by non-broadcast services, e.g., cable operators and direct broadcast satellite services (DBS), like DirecTV and the Dish Network. We will refer to the two types of programs as broadcast programs and ‘cable’ programs. For our purposes, the critical distinction between the two types of programs is that cable programs are received and viewed only by subscribers to cable and satellite services, while broadcast programs are received and viewed by cable and satellite subscribers (as retransmitted signals) and by viewers who rely solely on rooftop and set top antennas for receipt of the over-the-air signals broadcast by television stations.

To simplify the analysis and notation, we assume a single representative advertiser, which plays a role similar to the representative consumer employed in many monopolistic competition models. The advertiser sells a single product, produces a TV commercial to promote it, and purchases ad time on broadcast and cable programs to air the commercial. We assume: that only consumers who know about the advertiser’s product will buy it; that the probability of knowing of the product’s existence in the absence of advertising is less than unity; that exposure to an ad for a product makes a consumer aware of the product only if the consumer notices the ad within a program that carries it; and that the full effect of the ad on a consumer’s purchase probability is

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1 The notion that consumers’ media choices induces a segmentation of consumers with respect to advertising is consistent with evidence reported in Wedel and Kamakura (1998), among others, that such choices reflect a segmentation of consumers.
2 Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) are prominent examples.
realized the first time the consumer notices it. In particular, we allow for the possibility that a viewer may watch a program but fail to notice the advertiser’s ad during a commercial break. The advertiser can increase the probability viewers will notice its ad in a program by increasing the number of times the ad is aired during the program.

Viewers watch television for a period (say, a day), which we will call the viewing period, during which they have the opportunity to watch each of the programs offered by the broadcast and cable services once. The advertiser may purchase commercial time on any or all of these programs. At the end of the viewing period is a shopping day during which a viewer either may or may not purchase the advertiser’s product. We assume that noticing the advertiser’s commercial makes the same contribution to the purchase probability for all viewers.

The model makes use of the following terms:

\( m \equiv \) the number of cable programs. Subscripts \( h, i, \) and \( j \) will be employed to identify individual cable programs.

\( n \equiv \) the number of broadcast programs. Individual broadcast programs will be identified with the subscripts \( d, e, f, \) and \( g. \)

\( a_k \equiv \) the number of units of advertising time that the advertiser purchases from program \( k, \) where \( k \) may be either a cable program or a broadcast program, and a unit of ad time is the time required to play the advertiser’s commercial once.

\( r(a_k) \equiv \) the probability that a consumer watching program \( k \) will see and remember the ad for the advertiser’s product on program \( k. \) We assume \( r' > 0, r'' < 0, \) and \( r(0) = 0. \)

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\(^3\) We can relax our exposure assumption to allow a consumer’s purchase probability to be a concave function of the number of ad exposures. However, such a relaxation complicates our analysis without changing its basic conclusion regarding the nature of the ad time demand function faced by program owners.
\( p_{ik} \equiv \) the probability that a subscription viewer who watches cable program \( i \) will also watch program \( k \), where \( k \) may be either a broadcast program or a cable program.

\( p_{gk} \equiv \) the probability that a subscription viewer who watches broadcast program \( g \) will also watch program \( k \).

\( t_{gk} \equiv \) the probability that a broadcast-only viewer who watches broadcast program \( g \) will also watch program \( k \). (Obviously, \( t_{gk} = 0 \) if \( k \) is a cable program.)

\( V_g \equiv \) the number of broadcast-only viewers in the audience for broadcast program \( g \).

\( W_g \equiv \) the number of subscription viewers in the audience for broadcast program \( g \).

\( W_i \equiv \) the number of viewers in the audience for cable program \( i \).

Because the full contribution of an ad to a consumer’s likelihood of purchase is accomplished with a single noticed exposure, the value of ads on any given program is the contribution they make to the likelihood that a consumer will notice the ad at least once during the viewing period on any of the programs on which the ad airs. Thus, critical to our analysis are: \( S_i \), the probability that a viewer of cable program \( i \) will remember only an ad on program \( i \); \( B_f \), the probability that a broadcast-only viewer of broadcast program \( f \) will remember only an ad on program \( f \); and \( S_f \), the probability that a cable viewer in the audience for broadcast program \( f \) will remember only an ad for the product seen on program \( f \). Given the above definitions:

\[
S_i = \prod_{g=1}^{n} (1 - p_{gj} r(a_g)) \cdot \prod_{j \neq i} (1 - p_{gj} r(a_j)) r(a_i),
\]

\[
B_f = \prod_{g \neq f} (1 - t_{fg} r(a_g)) r(a_f),
\]
and
\[
S_f = \prod_{g \neq f} (1 - p_g r(a_g)) \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{m} (1 - p_f r(a_j)) r(a_f).
\]

Because it provides a simpler starting point while providing a useful comparative benchmark, we begin by examining the nature of competition among broadcast programs selling ad time in a hypothetical television market in which all programs are delivered by television stations over the air. This, of course, is a description of the market for television ad time before cable emerged as a major supplier of television audiences to advertisers in the 1980s. In modeling the competition in ad time, we take as givens the probabilities for each show that its viewers will also watch each of the other shows. This is not meant to imply that factors such as production and marketing budgets that may influence viewers’ choices among programs are not strategic variables—only that decisions on such variables precede the delivery of programs to viewers. That is, we assume that competition in the sale of ad time is competition in the sale of the audiences actually generated.\(^4\)

Consider first the advertiser’s decision regarding how much ad time to purchase on broadcast program \(f\), taking for the moment the amounts of time purchased on other programs as givens. (We show later that the equilibrium amount of time an advertiser purchases on one program is not influenced by the amount of time purchased on other programs.) For a representative viewer in \(f\)’s audience, the advertiser must consider two consequences of a small increase in the number of units of ad time purchased from \(f\). First, the purchase of additional ad time on \(f\) increases the probability that the viewer will notice the commercial at least once during the program, which increases the likelihood that the advertiser’s ad campaign in aggregate will make this viewer aware of its product. At the same time, however, the increased likelihood that the viewer will notice the commercial on program \(f\) reduces the contributions that the advertiser’s ads on other programs make to the likelihood that the viewer will become aware of its product. The

\(^4\) Note that we also assume that differences in viewers’ likelihoods of viewing different networks are not influenced by the amount of advertising time carried on the programs. This is a standard assumption in media economics literature; but if television ads are considered a bad by viewers, then the probability that a representative viewer chooses to watch any specific program should vary inversely with the amount of ad time sold by the program. See Wildman and Owen (1985), Wildman and Cameron (1989), Owen and Wildman (1992, chapter 4), and Wildman (1998), for analyses that consider this issue more explicitly.
net of these two effects on the likelihood that the viewer will notice the ad at least once on one of the television programs he or she watches, multiplied by the effect of noticing an ad on the likelihood of purchase times the advertiser’s profit margin on its product, is the value of the marginal unit of ad time on program \( f \) to the advertiser.

These considerations are reflected in the formal statement of the advertiser’s first order condition given by equation (1), where \( \gamma_f \) is the per unit price for ad time charged by program \( f \); \( w \) and \( c \), respectively, are the price and marginal cost of the good sold by the advertiser (both taken as constants); \( q \) is the number of units of the good purchased by a consumer who decides to buy; and \( \Delta \) is the contribution that noticing the ad makes to a consumer’s purchase probability.

\[
(w - c)q\Delta \left[ V_f \frac{\partial B_f}{\partial a_f} + \sum_{g \neq f} V_g \frac{\partial B_g}{\partial a_f} \right] - \gamma_f = 0. \tag{1}
\]

Expanding the expression in square brackets in (1), we have:

\[
(w - c)q\Delta r'(a_f) \left[ \prod_{g \neq f} V_f(1 - \sum_{g \neq f} - \sum_{e \neq f, g} V_g(1 - \sum_{e \neq f, g} r(a_g) r(a_g) t_{ge}) - \gamma_f = 0. \tag{1'}
\]

The first term within the square brackets is the probability that a viewer in the audience for program \( f \) will not notice the commercial on any other program during the viewing period. Multiplied by \( r'(a_f) \), it gives the marginal effect of an increase in \( a_f \) on the probability that this viewer will not notice the commercial on any other program and will notice it on program \( f \). The quantity \( r'(a_f) \) times the second term in the square brackets gives the sum of the effects of a marginal increase in \( a_f \) on the probabilities that the ad will be noticed on each of the other programs alone. Designate the first term in square brackets in (1’) by \( A_f \) and the second by \( B_f \). The difference \( A_f - B_f \) must be positive if program \( f \) finds it profitable to sell ad time.

We assume competition among programs to be Cournot in ad time, so the owner of program \( f \) takes the amount of ad time sold by other programs as givens in setting \( a_f \) to maximize \( R_f \), its revenue from ad time sales, where \( R_f = a_f \gamma_f \). Program \( f \)’s first order condition is:
\[
\frac{\partial \gamma_f}{\partial a_f} + \gamma_f = 0. \tag{2}
\]

Solving (1) and (2) simultaneously, we get (3), which implicitly determines \(a^*_f\), the profit maximizing value of \(a_f\) for program \(f\):

\[
a^*_f = \frac{(w - c)q \Delta r'(a^*_f) \left[A_f - B_f \right]}{(w - c)q \Delta r''(a^*_f) \left[A_f - B_f \right]} = \frac{r'(a^*_f)}{r''(a^*_f)}. \tag{3}
\]

Equation 3 tells us that the profit-maximizing amount of ad time in a program is a function of \(r\) alone, and is not influenced by the amount of ad time sold by other programs. The intuition for this result is that the advertiser values only those viewers of program \(f\) who will not see and notice its commercial on other programs. The parameter \(a^*_f\) is chosen to maximize the per viewer payment by the advertiser for access to these viewers and is independent of their number. Note also that (3) means that if the ad recall function, \(r\), is the same for all programs—that is, the program doesn’t influence the probability that an ad is noticed by a viewer, then the amount of ad time will be the same on all programs. This seems consistent with what is observed for network prime time television programs.

A fairly standard assumption in policy analyses of competition in TV advertising markets has been that competition forces all sellers of TV commercial time to adhere to a common, market-set price per viewer per ad unit in selling ad time to advertisers, once allowances are made for differences in the demographic characteristics of the audiences for different programs. That this “law of one price” would apply to advertising markets was a critical finding in Fournier and Martin’s (1983) influential econometric study of the effect of concentration on the pricing of ad time in local television markets. As support for this conclusion, they provided evidence that a common algorithm seemed to explain the per viewer ad time prices observed for a small sample of television stations they examined. With the model developed to this point, we can show that broadcast programs are not constrained by competition to charge a common per viewer price for ad time. Further, while it is certainly possible that profit maximizing per-viewer prices may differ
substantially across programs, under plausible assumptions, it should also not be surprising to find that they are quite similar.

Equations (1) and (1’) describe the inverse demand function for program $f$’s commercial time. Taking the total derivative of (1’) with respect to $a_f$, we get:

$$\frac{d\gamma_f}{da_f} = (w - c)q\Delta r^n(a_f)[A_f - B_f] < 0.$$  

Dividing this expression by $V_f$ gives the marginal effect of an increase in $a_f$ on the per viewer price of ad time on $f$, which must also be negative. So both the per unit price and the per viewer price of ad time decline in the amount of ad time sold, regardless of the competitive circumstances in which program $f$ sells its time. This makes sense because the program collects only on exposures to viewers who do not see the advertiser’s ad on other programs, and the marginal contribution of such exposures to the probability of purchase declines with the amount of ad time sold. There is no “one price” at which a program must sell access to its viewers.  

To more closely examine the factors that influence the relative per viewer prices charged by different programs, we compare the equilibrium per viewer prices for two programs, $f$ and $d$. For $r^* \equiv r(a^*)$, define $z_f$ and $z_d$ to be the equilibrium per viewer prices for ad time on broadcast programs $f$ and $d$.

$$z_f = \Phi \left[ \prod_{g \neq f} (1 - t_{fg}r^*) - \sum_{g \neq f} \prod_{e \neq f} \prod_{e \neq g} (1 - t_{ge}r^*)r^* t_{e} \right]$$  

and

$$z_d = \Phi \left[ \prod_{g \neq d} (1 - t_{dg}r^*) - \sum_{g \neq d} \prod_{e \neq d} \prod_{e \neq g} (1 - t_{ge}r^*)r^* t_{e} \right],$$  

where $\Phi \equiv r'(a^*)(w - c)q\Delta$.

A close comparison of these two expressions reveals that the sale of ad time on program $d$ affects the per viewer price of time sold on program $f$ (and vice versa) only if $t_{fd} > 0$ (which implies $t_{df} > 0$). That is, if the two programs have no viewers in common, then ad time prices for the two programs will be set independently of each other. Thus,
consumer media choices segment this advertising market. It should also be clear that even if $t_{fd} > 0$, so that segmentation is less than complete, there is still no a priori reason $z_f$ should be equal to $z_d$, because of the possibility that $t_{fg} \neq t_{dg}$ and $t_{gf} \neq t_{gd}$. Thus, the standard assumption that exposures to demographically similar viewers may be treated as units of a homogeneous commodity for which there is a single market clearing price at which all units must be sold is seen to be incorrect. This conclusion necessarily follows from the fact that each viewer represents a separate and independent source of potential profit to an advertiser. Only in the unlikely event that $t_{fd} = t_{df} = 1$, so that each viewer in program $f$’s audience is a member of program $d$’s audience and vice versa, can we be assured that ad time prices for the two programs will be the same.

On the other hand, if a viewer’s presence in the audience for one program is not predictive of his or her likelihood of watching any other program, then $t_{fg} = t_{dg} = t_{eg}$, and so on, and the first term in square brackets would have the same value in equations (4) and (5). In a simplified version of the extended model developed below, in which a common viewing probability is assumed for all broadcast programs, we show that the influence on per viewer price of the analogue of the second term in square brackets in (4) and (5) will be trivial compared to the influence of the first term as long as $n$ is sufficiently large (an $n$ of 20 is more than sufficient) and the product of $r^*$ and the viewing probability is substantially less than one. As the major broadcast networks’ programs average only about 10 percent of the potential audience in prime time, the viewing probability itself should satisfy this criterion. Thus it is plausible that observed per viewer prices will be approximately the same for all broadcast programs. Finding such a relationship should not be interpreted, however, as evidence that competition forces all sellers to offer access to their viewers at a common price—only that when faced with similar demands for their ad time, they set similar prices.

### 2.2 The extended model

The analysis to this point has assumed likelihoods of watching different programs that are common to all viewers. However, if viewers differ in their likelihoods of 

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5 Allowing for ads on other media does not change this conclusion. A program owner will still price its ad time to maximize the advertiser’s payments for its incremental contribution to the probability that its
watching different programs, and if these differences are understood by advertisers, then we should expect that, embedded in the per unit time prices charged by programs, there are per viewer prices that vary among viewers according to their viewing habits. Because the option to receive programming signals via cable changes viewing patterns relative to what they would be if only broadcast programs were available, one might therefore expect the broadcast networks to charge advertisers different prices for access to the subscription and broadcast-only viewers in their audiences. This possibility was suggested by Wildman (1998). Here we explore this possibility by extending the model presented above to include subscription viewers. We assume that program suppliers are able to set per-viewer prices for ad time that vary according to viewer characteristics, including whether they do or do not subscribe to cable. We then determine the price program owners would charge for access to subscription viewers and compare it to the broadcast-only price derived above. That prices advertisers pay for ad time might reflect different weights applied to viewers with different demographic characteristics is generally accepted, and indeed is the justification for collection of this data by audience measurement services. For this analysis we hold demographic characteristics constant across viewers, but allow for the possibility that per viewer prices may be influenced by differential access to cable programs.

Imagine for the moment that the owner of broadcast program $g$ can sell different amounts of ad time for access to the subscription and broadcast-only portions of his or her audience. Let $\lambda_g$ be the price per unit of ad time charged for access to $g$’s cable audience, and let $\tilde{a}_g$ be the amount of ad time purchased by the advertiser. Then equation (6) would be our advertiser’s first order condition for purchasing ad time for $g$’s cable audience.

$$\Phi \left[ W_g \frac{\partial S_g}{\partial a_g} + \sum_{f \neq g} W_f \frac{\partial S_f}{\partial a_g} + \sum_j \frac{\partial S_j}{\partial a_g} \right] - \lambda_g = 0 \quad (6)$$

message will be noticed. The only difference is that ads on other media now influence this calculation.
The first order condition for the sale of ad time for program \( g \)’s cable audience would be:

\[
\tilde{a}_g \frac{\partial \lambda_g}{\partial \tilde{a}_g} + \lambda_g = 0 \quad (7)
\]

Solving (6) and (7) simultaneously for the profit maximizing value of \( \tilde{a}_g \), not surprisingly we get

\[
\tilde{a}_g^* = -\frac{r'(a^*_g)}{r''(a^*_g)} = a^*
\]

So \( a^* \) maximizes the revenue from ad time sales to both cable viewers and broadcast-only viewers. This means that a broadcast program with both cable and broadcast-only viewers in its audience is able to maximize the ad revenues associated with each of the subsets of its audience by selling \( a^* \) units of ad time.

Using \( a^* \) in equation (6) and dividing by \( W_g \) gives \( \xi_g \), the equilibrium per-viewer price for ad time paid by the advertiser for access to the cable viewers in \( g \)’s audience.

\[
\xi_g = \Phi \left[ \prod_{j \neq g} (1 - p_{gf} r^*) \prod_j (1 - p_{gf} r^*) - \sum_{j \neq g} \frac{W}{W_g} \prod_{j \neq g} (1 - p_{jg} r^*) \prod_{f \neq g} (1 - p_{jg} r^*) r^* p_{fg} 
\right.
\]

\[
= \Phi \left[ -\sum_{j \neq g} \frac{W}{W_g} \prod_j (1 - p_{gf} r^*) \prod_{e \neq f, g} (1 - p_{e} r^*) r^* p_{fg} \right].
\]

(8)

We simplify equation (8) by assuming that for a representative subscriber there is a common probability \( \alpha \) of watching any given broadcast program, and a common probability \( \beta \) of watching any given cable program. In this case, \( W_j/W_g = \beta/\alpha \), all \( j \) and \( g \), and \( W_f/W_g = 1 \), for all \( f \) and \( g \). Given these assumptions,

\[
\xi_g = \Phi \left[ (1 - \alpha r^*)^{-1} (1 - \beta r^*)^{-1} - m \frac{\beta}{\alpha} (1 - \beta r^*)^{-1} ((1 - \alpha r^*) a r^*)^{-1} - (n - 1)(1 - \beta r^*)(1 - \alpha r^*) \right] \quad (9)
\]

For the representative viewer, total viewing time during the viewing period will be \( \alpha n + \beta m \). In the United States, the dramatic growth in the number of per-household
viewing hours devoted to cable programming has occurred largely at the expense of time spent watching broadcast programs, rather than through an increase in total viewing hours. If we assume that audience gains for cable programs are reflected in a numerically equivalent reduction in the aggregate audience for broadcast programs, then, for $\bar{\alpha}$ the initial base value of $\alpha$ when $\beta = 0$, 

$$\frac{d\alpha}{d\beta} = -\frac{m}{n}$$

and

$$\alpha(\beta) = \bar{\alpha} - \frac{m}{n}\beta.$$ 

If a cable viewer who watches only broadcast programs has the same viewing likelihoods for broadcast programs as a broadcast-only viewer, $z_h$ and $\xi_g$ must have the same value. Taking this situation as a benchmark, we used equation (9) to examine the effect of increasing the likelihoods that cable viewers will watch cable programs on the relative values of $z_h$ and $\xi_g$ by examining the effect of increasing $\beta$ on $\xi_g$ for different values of the parameters $n, m, r^*$ and $\bar{\alpha}$ for $\Phi$ set at the arbitrary value of $10$.

Tables 1 and 2 present results for two of these exercises. The last four lines in each table present, respectively, the values of the three terms inside the square brackets in (9) multiplied by $10$, and the price per cable viewer, which is $10$ times the first term minus the second and the third terms. Dashes indicate values so small that the program used for the calculations rounded them to zero. In both tables, the price per subscription viewer rises above the price charged for a broadcast-only viewer as cable programs’ audiences grow from very low initial levels and stays above the broadcast-only price even as cable program viewing probabilities approach those for broadcast programs. The same basic pattern was revealed in most, though not all, of our numerical applications of equation (9). In particular, the cable price per viewer may fall continuously from the broadcast-only level for very small values of $n$ and/or $r^*$.

If we assume six half-hour programs during prime time for a viewing period of five week days, then Table 1 would reflect the prime-time options available to the subscribers of a cable system or satellite service carrying five broadcast networks and 15 ad-supported cable networks. The viewer depicted would watch an average of 15
programs per week, or an hour and a half of prime time programs during a typical
evening. Table 2 might reflect ad pricing for viewers who watch one hour of prime
time programs per night and select from a much smaller set of 20 broadcast and 50 cable
programs—either because their pay service offers them fewer options or because they
have restricted the set of programs from which they choose to some subset of the
programs available by excluding, perhaps based on prior experience or word of mouth,
programs they believe are unlikely to provide them with a satisfactory viewing
experience.

We can say a bit more about the generality of the pricing pattern reflected in
Tables 1 and 2 by noting that the first term in square brackets in (9) almost solely drives
the relationship between cable viewing shares and per viewer prices due to the effects of
\((\alpha r^*)^{n-1}\) and \((\alpha r^*)^{n-2}\) in the second and third terms. The derivative of the first term with
respect to \(\beta\) is

\[
\Psi \left[ nr^*(\alpha - \beta) - 1 + r^* \beta \right],
\]

where, \(\Psi = m r^*(1 - \alpha r^*)^{n-2}(1 - \beta r^*)^{m-1} \).

This expression may be positive or negative, but there must be some threshold
value of \(\beta, \hat{\beta} < \alpha(\hat{\beta})\), beyond which this expression is always negative, so that
increasing cable program viewing likelihoods beyond this point causes the per-viewer
price for cable viewers to fall. For \(\beta=0\), this expression is positive as long as \(n\alpha > 1/r^*\),
and the likelihood that growth in audiences for cable programs will increase the per
viewer price charged advertisers for access to subscribers relative to the price for non-
subscribers in broadcast program audiences increases in \(n, \alpha\) and \(r^*\). The quantity \(n\alpha\) is
the number of programs watched by a representative viewer during a typical viewing
period. Thus, for \(r^*=1\) and a program length of half an hour, the price per cable viewer in
a broadcast program’s audience would rise above the price per broadcast-only viewer as
audiences for cable programs began to grow from zero as long as the typical cable viewer
spent more than an hour per week watching prime time programs. For \(r^*=0.05\), the cable
per viewer ad price would rise as cable program audiences grew from zero if the typical
cable viewer watched more than 10 hours of prime time television each week, and it would fall otherwise.

3. A Test of the model

We cannot test our model directly due to data limitations, but we can test one of its implications. One distinguishing feature of our model is that consumers’ media choices segment advertising markets, or more narrowly, the mode by which consumers view television programs likely segments the television advertising market. Consequently the prices that advertisers pay for television advertising will depend upon the mix of viewers according to their mode of viewing (i.e., broadcast-only versus ‘cable’). This implication is in sharp contract to the “law of one price” implication of assuming that advertisers are willing to pay a constant amount per viewer delivered, regardless of the mode by which they are delivered. Thus we can test our model by discerning whether advertisers pay different implicit prices for delivered viewers according to their mode of viewing. This is task to which we now turn.

3.1 The Data

Beginning with their November, 1996 National Audience Demographics report, Nielsen Media Research began breaking out broadcast-only television households. Using these data, we focus on network television programs broadcast during the period 28 October-24 November 1996. We focus on broadcast network television programs, rather than local programs, for several reasons. The main reason is that these programs reach enough broadcast-only television households that one might expect to discern a broadcast-only price effect.

Of all the broadcast network television programs monitored by Nielsen, we focus upon regularly-scheduled prime time network television shows of the largest networks (ABC, CBS, FOX, and NBC). This means that we exclude specials such as "When Animals Attack", and programs such as "Monday Night Football" and "Tuesday Night Movie" for which there might be a significant amount of advertiser uncertainty about what audiences are to be delivered by the programming. We exclude non-prime time network programs because of the variability of clearance of network programs outside of
prime time.

For the period 28 October-24 November 1996, there are 108 such shows. From Nielsen (1996a), for each show, we obtain the total number of viewers (in thousands) aged 18-49 (TOT) and the number of viewers (in thousands) aged 18-49 whose reception is broadcast-only (BO). Subtracting the latter from the former gives the number of non-broadcast or ‘cable’ viewers (C). From Nielsen (1996b), we obtained the cost (in thousands of dollars) per thirty second commercial (COST) for each show. This figure represents Nielsen's estimate, based upon data supplied by the networks, of the average price paid for a thirty second commercial during the network program.6

3.2 The statistical model

We assume that advertisers buying network advertising time are buying access to the audiences delivered by network programming. Thus the demand for a 30 second commercial aired during a network program depends upon the audience delivered. On the supply side, we assume broadcast networks determine the audiences they will supply and compete on price. This is consistent with several points. First, networks determine their program offerings in advance of the sale of advertising time. Further, the advertising time supplied by networks is fixed and perishable. Finally, there is little variation in the amount of advertising time offered by networks during an hour of network programming, across quarters and networks.7

The above points imply that our data on a cross-section of broadcast network programs allows us to estimate the implicit prices of different delivered audiences. Let the total audience delivered be decomposed into \( n \) mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups, \( X_1, \ldots, X_n \). Thus, following Moulton (1991), we express the cost of a 30 second commercial aired during a broadcast network program as:

\[
COST = p_1X_1 + \cdots + p_nX_n
\]

6 Using Nielsen's estimate of the average price means that we can ignore the influence of features specific to particular network advertising contracts and focus on the features common to all such contracts for network programs, i.e. the characteristics of the audiences delivered.

7 See table on page 19 of Broadcasting & Cable, (March 21, 1997) for data on the amount of network advertising time across time and networks.
where \( p_i \) represents the implicit price of a viewer in group \( i \). Since we can reasonably assume that the \( X_i \) are given for each program in our sample, we can estimate the \( p_i \). For our purposes, we divide the total observed audience of a network program (\( TOT \)) into two components according to whether the viewing household receives broadcast signals only (\( BO \)) or not (\( C \)). If the law of one price is applies to network audiences, then the implicit prices of these components should be the same (\( i.e. \), advertisers should not value viewers differently simply because of the medium by which viewers obtain network programming). It is important to note that unless one argues that the kind of people who watch a broadcast network program on cable are radically different from the kind of people who watch the same broadcast network program over-the-air, then our design effectively controls for the audience demographic composition between these two mode of program delivery.

### 3.3 The relationship between the cost of a network ad and its audience size

We begin with an examination of the relationship between the cost of a 30 second ad during a network program and the total audience size delivered by the associated program. We do so for two reasons. First, it allows us to estimate the value advertisers put on an additional broadcast network program viewer irrespective of their other characteristics. Second, it allows us to examine possible nonlinearities in this relationship. This last consideration is important for how we test for differences in the pricing of such advertising according to the mode of viewing.

Figure 1 indicates that some of the observations clearly are influential, and may in fact be outliers. Subsequent examination of univariate plots of \( COST \) and \( TOT \) indicates that the four rightmost observations might be outliers. A block test for discordancy in a linear model based on recursive residuals (Hawkins, 1980, §7.2) rejects the null hypothesis of no outliers. To see the implications of removing these four observations, we display the lines of best fit for all 102 observations, and for the first 98 observations. In what follows we use the first 98 observations.\(^9\)

---

\(^8\) We test and validate the reasonableness of this linear specification in the next section.

\(^9\) Our qualitative results are the same for both 98 and 102 observations.
Figure 1 also suggests that the relationship between \(COST\) and \(TOT\) might be linear. To test this hypothesis, we regress a third-order polynomial in total audience delivered on the cost of the associated network advertising time. This can be viewed as a test of the linearity of this relationship. The results of this estimation are as follows:

\[
COST = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TOT + \beta_2 TOT^2 + \beta_3 TOT^3 + \varepsilon
\]

\[
-52.028 + 0.036 TOT - 1.9 \times 10^{-6} TOT^2 - 6.9 \times 10^{-11} TOT^3
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
(1.16) & (2.02) & (-0.86) \\
0.77
\end{array}
\]

where \(t\)-statistics are reported within parentheses. These results strongly suggest that \(COST\) is linear in \(TOT\) as the second and third order terms are insignificant. An F-test of this hypothesis confirms this inference: \(F(2, 94) = 0.408\) with marginal significance level (m.s.l) = 0.666. Additionally, fitting local quadratic functions by the method of loess (Cleveland, 1993) also indicates linearity. Thus, these data strongly suggest that \(COST\) is linear in \(TOT\).

Given this evidence, we estimate the relationship between \(COST\) and \(TOT\) as:

\[
COST = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TOT + \varepsilon
\]

\[
-12.5 + 0.0205 TOT
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cc}
(-1.6) & (17.90) \\
0.769
\end{array}
\]

\[
R^2 = 0.769
\]

with \(t\)-statistics in parentheses. Using the Eicker-White procedure for testing for heteroscedasticity, we regress the squared residuals from (12) on a third-order polynomial in \(TOT\). The heteroscedasticity test statistic is 5.2 with m.s.l. 0.16; thus homoscedasticity is not rejected. The Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality is 1.580 with m.s.l. 0.454, so the null hypothesis of normality is not rejected. Thus we conclude that \(COST\) is linear in \(TOT\) and that advertisers paid just over two cents per viewer during our sample period.

### 3.4 Evidence on Segmentation in Pricing

Thus far our evidence is consistent with a homogeneous-good treatment of advertising, as employed in Berry and Waldfogel (1999) for example. To address the question of whether advertisers pay a different price for broadcast-only viewers from
cable viewers, we proceed in two steps. First, we examine if the mix of viewers according to mode is an additional factor influencing pricing. Then, if so, what are the implicit prices for these two types of viewers, and are they the same. The ‘law of one price’ requires that they be the same; our model does not.

If consumers’ media choices induce a segmentation of advertising markets, then one should find that the mix of viewers according to their mode of viewing will influence the pricing of national television advertising. To test this hypothesis, we regress COST on TOT and a variable, FBO, representing the fraction of a program’s viewing audience that received the programming through broadcast television only. The results are:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{COST} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{TOT} + \beta_2 \text{FBO} + \varepsilon \\
&= 44.863 + 0.0186 \times \text{TOT} - 151.359 \times \text{FBO} \\
&= (1.39) \quad (12.88) \quad (1.96)
\end{align*}
\]

\[R^2 = 0.7782\]

with \(t\)-statistics in parentheses. These results suggest that the mix of viewers according to their mode of viewing is another factor influencing the pricing of national television advertising. Roughly speaking, these estimates suggest that a 1% increase in the proportion of viewers accounted for by broadcast only viewers lowers the cost of a thirty second commercial by over $1,500, which suggests that these results are economically significant as well as statistically significant.

These results also suggest that advertisers are paying different prices for cable and broadcast-only viewers. To address what those prices might be, we break TOT into cable viewers (C) and broadcast-only viewers (BO) and examine the relationship between COST and the number of viewers in each of these segments. Our prior evidence on the relationship between COST and TOT suggests that this relationship might be linear. To test this conjecture, we first examine the data graphically, and then statistically.

An examination of Figure 2 supports our conjecture as \(COST\) appears linear in \(BO\), given \(C\), and \(COST\) appears to be linearly related to \(BO\) and \(C\).\(^{10}\) To test this hypothesis, we regress \(COST\) on \(BO\), \(BO^2\), \(C\), \(BO \times C\) and \(C^2\), and compare its results to a regression of \(COST\) on \(BO\) and \(C\). The resulting Wald test statistic equals 1.958 and thus fails to reject the joint hypothesis that \(\beta_{BO^2}\), \(\beta_{BO \times C}\) and \(\beta_{C^2}\) equal zero. Trivariate coplots

---

\(^{10}\) We omit lines of best fit in Figure 2 because it is inappropriate to impute all of \(COST\) to either \(BO\) or \(C\).
(Cleveland, 1993) also indicate that $COST$ is linear in both $BO$ conditional on $C$ and $C$ conditional on $BO$. Consequently, we reject the hypothesis that $COST$ is nonlinear in $BO$ and $C$.

If the ‘law of one price’ holds, then the price of an additional broadcast-only viewer should be equal to the price of an additional cable viewer. To test this proposition, we estimate the following regression:

$$COST = \beta_0 + \beta_{BO} BO + \beta_{C} C + \epsilon$$

$$= -0.33 + 0.0049 BO + 0.0242 C$$

$$R^2 = 0.7755$$

with $t$-statistics reported in parentheses. These results are inconsistent with the law of one price: the point estimates imply two and one-half cents per cable viewer, and one-half of one cent per broadcast viewer. However, the insignificance of $\beta_{BO}$ implies that advertisers are not paying for broadcast-only viewers. Since the proportion of broadcast-only viewers ranges from 0.15 to 0.40, we find this difficult to accept. The high $R^2$ and insignificant $t$-statistics suggest collinearity as a reason for this aberrant result. The standard diagnostics (Judge, et al, 1988, §21.3.1) indicate the presence of multicollinearity. The simple correlation between $BO$ and $C$ is 0.85, which is high, and is greater than the $R^2$ from Eq. 14. Rescaling the independent variables to have unit length, but not recentering, yields a largest-to-smallest eigenvalue ratio whose square root is 11,938. These results suggest that further analysis of multicollinearity is warranted.

### 3.5 Diagnosing Multicollinearity

Multicollinearity does not mean that all coefficients will be estimated with great imprecision. In fact, it is possible to determine which coefficients will be estimated precisely and which coefficients will be estimated imprecisely due to the multicollinearity. However, further analysis is necessary to accomplish this.

The possible effect of this multicollinearity can be assessed in the usual fashion using Silvey’s (1969) method (see also Judge, et al, 1985, §22.3) and Belsley's (1991) guide to implementing the method. For this analysis the variables are rescaled to have unit length but are not recentered (Belsley, 1991, §3.3).
First note that the variance of an individual coefficient can be written as,

$$\text{var}(b_k) = \sigma^2 \sum_{j=1}^{K} \frac{p_{jk}^2}{\lambda_j}, \quad (15)$$

where $\sigma^2$ is the error variance and $p_{jk}$ is the k-th element of the normalized eigenvector associated with the j-th eigenvalue, $\lambda_j$. The proportion of $\text{var}(b_k)$ associated with any single characteristic root is

$$\phi_{kj} = \frac{\frac{p_{kj}^2}{\lambda_j}}{\sum_{j=1}^{K} \frac{p_{kj}^2}{\lambda_j}} \quad (16)$$

and the condition indices of $X$ are given by $\eta_j = \frac{\lambda_{\text{max}}}{\lambda_j}$ so that $\lambda_j$ necessarily assumes its minimum of 1.0 for some $j$.

Table 3 gives the variance-decomposition proportions, where the leftmost column gives the condition index and each of the three rightmost columns sums to unity. The condition indices are extremely large, since a condition index in excess of 30 is considered evidence of multicollinearity. Examining the condition indices, we see immediately that the third eigenvalue is troublesome, and the second eigenvalue might be. The presence of two or more large $\phi_{kj}$ in a row indicates that multicollinearity associated with that row's characteristic root adversely affects the precision of the estimated coefficients. Here, $\phi_{kj} > 0.50$ is taken to be large (Belsley, et al, 1980). Hence, we conclude that the third eigenvalue alone is the source of the multicollinearity.

The multicollinearity induced by the third eigenvalue does not necessarily affect all the coefficients, since from Eq. 15 we see that the k-th coefficient is unaffected by the j-the root as long as $p_{kj}$ is small. Table 4 gives the matrix of normalized eigenvectors. Examining the third row, we see that $p_{3,3}$ is small, so we can expect a good estimate of $\beta_c$. From the second row, $p_{2,3}$ is not small, so we can expect that the estimate of $\beta_{BO}$ will be substantially affected by the multicollinearity, and will be "nearly inestimable". Vinod and Ullah (1981, §5.3.2) explain how near inestimability arising from multicollinearity can lead to "wrong" signs or insignificance, casting further doubt on the validity of (14). Based on a priori knowledge of the broadcast industry and
the eigenvalue analysis, we believe that accurate parameter estimates will show that $\beta_c$ is "close" to two and one half cents and that $\beta_{BO}$ is not "close" to one half of one cent.

### 3.6 Estimating the implicit prices

Any particular multicollinearity problem can be characterized either as a sample problem or a population problem. In the former case, the best solution is to increase the sample size. In the present case, television programs with a larger broadcast-only audience tend also to have a larger cable audience, so the problem can be characterized as a population problem. The standard textbook remedies (drop a variable, principal component regression, etc.) are all unsatisfactory. To estimate the change in cost attributable to a marginal change in the number of broadcast-only viewers, $\beta_{BO}$, ideally we should like to regress that part of cost not attributable to non-broadcast viewers, $(C - \beta_c C)$, on the number of broadcast-only viewers, BO; *i.e.*, regress $(C - \beta_c C)$ on BO. Unfortunately, this method for estimating $\beta_{BO}$ assumes that we already know $\beta_c$.

Similarly, if we already knew $\beta_{BO}$, then we could regress $(C - \beta_{BO} BO)$ on C to estimate the change in cost due to a marginal increase in the number of cable viewers, $\beta_c$.

Obviously, we cannot directly pursue either of these strategies because we do not have *a priori* knowledge of either $\beta_c$ or $\beta_{BO}$. However, we can pursue equivalent strategies that will lead to good estimates of $\beta_c$ and $\beta_{BO}$ that are not contaminated by multicollinearity.

To obtain accurate estimates of $\beta_{BO}$ and $\beta_c$, we shall reduce the dimension of the parameter space (Judge, et al, 1984, §22.4.2), and then reparametrize the model (Spanos, 1986, §20.5 gives the theory; Hendry, 1996, p. 276 gives an example). Moreover, the transformed model provides for direct estimation of the parameters of interest, so there is no need to "reinterpret" our estimates in term of the original parameters.

For each program the marginal cost of an "average" viewer must be the weighted sum of the costs of broadcast and cable viewers. We take this to be the linear weighted sum:
\[
\beta_T = \gamma_{BO} \beta_{BO} + \gamma_C \beta_C + \varepsilon
\]  
(17)

where \(\gamma_{BO}\) is the proportion of the audience which is broadcast-only and \(\gamma_C\) is the proportion of the audience which is cable. Since this holds true for individual observations, it must hold true for the means, which we shall denote with an overbar.

Define the two series \(\gamma_{BO} = BO/(BO + C)\) and \(\gamma_C = C/(BO + C)\) which have means \(\overline{\gamma}_{BO} = 0.2991\) and \(\overline{\gamma}_{NB} = 0.7009\), respectively, and a common standard error of the sample mean, 0.0046.

Solving (17) for \(\beta_{BO}\), using \(\overline{\gamma}_{BO}\), \(\overline{\gamma}_{C}\) and \(\hat{T}_\beta\) for \(\gamma_{BO}\), \(\gamma_C\), and \(\beta_T\), substituting into (14), and rearranging yields the following reparametrized regression

\[
\begin{align*}
COST - \frac{\beta_T}{\overline{\gamma}_{BO}} BO &= c_3 + \beta_C \left( C - \frac{\overline{\gamma}_{C}}{\overline{\gamma}_{BO}} \right) + \varepsilon \\
&= -13.1 + 0.0230 (9.52) \\
&= -4.7 + (9.52) \\
R^2 &= 0.4858
\end{align*}
\]  
(18)

which has one less dimension than the multicollinear regression (14). Note that this estimate of \(\beta_C = 0.0230\) is "close" to two and one-half cents.

Repeating the procedure, this time focusing on \(\beta_{BO}\) yields \(\hat{\beta}_{BO} = 0.0145\) with a \(t\)-stat of 2.604. Note that this estimate of \(\beta_C = 0.0145\) is not "close" to one-half of one cent, but is instead almost one and one-half cents. The reparameterization (18) might appear ungainly, though it has a simple intuition. Some algebra (see the Appendix) shows that the regression (18) is equivalent to:

\[
COST - \beta_{BO} BO = c_3 + \beta_C C + \varepsilon
\]  
(19)

The left hand side of this equation is simply \(COST\) less that portion attributable to broadcast viewers.\(^{11}\) Thus the reparameterization (18) is equivalent to a regression on the portion of \(COST\) attributable to cable viewers on the number of cable viewers. A similar interpretation holds for the reparameterization effected by focusing on \(\beta_{BO}\).

\(^{11}\) Because there is a constant term on the right hand side and only the slope is of interest, it is immaterial whether we specify the \(COST\) attributable to broadcast viewers at \(\alpha + \beta_{BO} BO\) or just \(\beta_{BO} BO\).
Of interest is whether the fit based on the reparameterized results is significantly different than the initial least squares result. Regressing $COST$ on the artificial variable $W = 0.0145 BO + 0.0230 C$ yields:

$$
COST = c_4 + \beta_W W + \epsilon
$$

\[\begin{array}{cccc}
-7.6 & 0.9595W & (18.10) \\
-1.0 & & \\
\end{array}\] (20)

whose $R^2$ compares favorably with the results of Equation 4. A test for loss of fit (Greene, 1997, §7.4), treating (20) as the restricted regression, yields $F(1,95)=0.87$ with m.s.l. = 0.352. Thus the fits of Equations 14 and 20 are in substantial agreement.

We see, then, that an advertiser will pay about 2.3 cents for an additional cable viewer, and just under 1.5 cents for an additional broadcast viewer, i.e., an additional cable viewer is 59% ($= 100(0.0230/0.0145 - 1)$%) more valuable to the network than an additional broadcast viewer. The difference in prices paid is consistent with our model of the market for television advertising, and strongly rejects the ‘law of one price’ for television advertising.

4. Summary and Conclusions

While advertising plays a critical role in the funding of media, including Internet, in the United States, researchers have devoted relatively little attention to the way media firm price access to their audiences. Rather, more attention has been given to the relationship between advertising and firm sales, and thereby on the demand for advertising in aggregate.

This paper presents a model of a competitive market for television advertising time that focuses on advertisers’ demand for advertising based upon its contribution to their profit, consistent with prior literature on the relationship between advertising and firm sales, and that allows for consumer media choices to segment advertising markets. Our model implies that prices may vary among programs, and, for broadcast programs, that different implicit per-viewer prices may be charged for those members of their audiences that do and do not subscribe to cable or satellite services. These predictions
stand in stark contrast to the nearly standard assumption, going back to Steiner (1952) that a common per viewer price must apply to all ad units sold in these same markets.

Our econometric study of broadcast network advertising prices for 108 prime time programs suggests that networks are effectively charging substantially different per viewer prices for the cable viewers (non-broadcast only viewers) in their audiences than for their broadcast-only viewers. This evidence is consistent with the model proposed in this paper and rejects the standard assumption that prices in advertising markets are subject to the ‘law of one price’ regardless of mode of delivery. Interestingly, our results are consistent with Liebowitz’s (1982) evidence that cable segmented the television advertising market in Canada.

As parting comments, we note that technologies marrying the Internet and television are making it possible for advertisers to better track the viewers of programs they advertise on. The recent controversy over Tivo’s use of its Internet connection to upload data on its subscribers’ viewing habits is one example of what is now possible and will become more prevalent in the future. This feature of an Internet TV service can be incorporated in the model developed above by eliminating the likelihoods associated with viewers’ choices. Instead the expressions for the value of advertising time will have only the $r$ component of the expressions for the probability of the advertiser’s commercial being noticed on a particular program, and only programs actually watched (rather than the larger set of potentially watched programs) will be retained in these expressions. With interactive commercials, advertisers would also have firmer knowledge of whether their commercials were noticed as well, which would modify $r$. Consequently we expect the considerations put forth in this paper to be applicable to future video advertising as technology changes the delivery of video programming. Further, the factors affecting the revenue realizable from the sale of in-program ad time identified in this paper should also be included in an assessment of tradeoffs between advertising and subscription revenues using a framework similar to that set out by Prasad, Mahajan, and Bronnenberg (2003).
References


Table 1
Effect of Growth in Cable Viewing on Per Viewer Price for Cable Subscribers:
for $n=150, m=450, r^*=0.25$ and $\bar{r}=0.1$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0.005</th>
<th>0.01</th>
<th>0.02</th>
<th>0.022</th>
<th>0.024</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1(^{st}) term</td>
<td>23.00¢</td>
<td>23.21¢</td>
<td>23.35¢</td>
<td>23.44¢</td>
<td>23.43¢</td>
<td>23.41¢</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(^{nd}) term</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3(^{rd}) term</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price per viewer</td>
<td>23.00¢</td>
<td>23.21¢</td>
<td>23.35¢</td>
<td>23.44¢</td>
<td>23.43¢</td>
<td>23.41¢</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Calculated values of less than $10^{-250}$¢.
Table 2
Effect of Growth in Cable Viewing on Per Viewer Price for Cable Subscribers:
for n=20, m=50, r*=0.25 and \( \bar{\alpha}=0.5 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \beta )</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0.05</th>
<th>0.08</th>
<th>0.10</th>
<th>0.12</th>
<th>0.14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha )</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st term</td>
<td>14.41¢</td>
<td>16.61¢</td>
<td>17.33¢</td>
<td>17.55¢</td>
<td>17.53¢</td>
<td>17.30¢</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd term</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd term</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price per viewer</td>
<td>14.41¢</td>
<td>16.61¢</td>
<td>17.33¢</td>
<td>17.55¢</td>
<td>17.53¢</td>
<td>17.30¢</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Calculated values of less than 10^{-10}¢.
### Table 3
Variance Decomposition Proportions, $\phi_{kj}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\eta_j$</th>
<th>var($\hat{c}_j$)</th>
<th>var($\hat{\beta}_{BO}$)</th>
<th>var($\hat{\beta}_C$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>k=1</td>
<td>k=2</td>
<td>k=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00000</td>
<td>j=1</td>
<td>4.2E-15</td>
<td>1.5E-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,978,879</td>
<td>j=2</td>
<td>0.4622</td>
<td>0.0202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142,526,043</td>
<td>j=3</td>
<td>0.5378</td>
<td>0.9798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>j=1</td>
<td>j=2</td>
<td>j=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k=1</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>-0.9305</td>
<td>0.3663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k=2</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>-0.3663</td>
<td>-0.9305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k=3</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1
Scatter of COST on TOT
Figure 2
Scatter of COST on BO(x) and C(+)

Number of Viewers (000)
Appendix

Ideally, letting $C = \text{COST}$, we would like to estimate

$$C - \beta_{BO} BO = c_3 + \beta_c C + \varepsilon$$

We show that the above is algebraically equivalent to (18), which we repeat immediately below:

$$C - \frac{\beta_T}{\bar{Y}_{BO}} BO = c_3 + \beta_c \left( C - \frac{\bar{Y}_c}{\bar{Y}_{BO}} BO \right) + \varepsilon$$

(18a)

What can be made of the slope term?

$$\beta_c \left( C - \frac{\bar{Y}_c}{\bar{Y}_{BO}} BO \right) = \beta_c C - \beta_C \frac{\bar{Y}_c}{\bar{Y}_{BO}} BO$$

Look now at the second term on the RHS. Solving (18) for $\beta_c$ and inserting,

$$-\beta_c \frac{\bar{Y}_c}{\bar{Y}_{BO}} BO = - \left( \frac{\beta_T - \bar{Y}_{BO} \beta_{BO}}{\bar{Y}_c} \right) \frac{\bar{Y}_c}{\bar{Y}_{BO}} BO$$

$$= - \left( \frac{\beta_T - \bar{Y}_{BO} \beta_{BO}}{\bar{Y}_{BO}} \right) BO$$

$$= - \frac{\beta_T}{\bar{Y}_{BO}} BO + \beta_{BO} BO$$

So we can rewrite (18) as: $C - \frac{\beta_T}{\bar{Y}_{BO}} BO = c_3 + \beta_c C - \frac{\bar{Y}_c}{\bar{Y}_{BO}} BO + \beta_{BO} BO + \varepsilon$.

Adding $\frac{\beta_T}{\bar{Y}_{BO}} BO$ to each side yields: $C = c_3 + \beta_c C + \beta_{BO} BO + \varepsilon$.

Subtracting $\bar{Y}_{BO} BO$ from each side yields: $C - \beta_{BO} BO = c_3 + \beta_c C + \varepsilon$

Q.E.D.